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Uber law and awareness by design . 
An empirical study on online platforms 
and dehumanised negotiations
GUIDO NOTO LA DIEGA*
Cet article met en lumière les principaux aspects de droit de la consommation de l’écono-
mie de partage à travers une analyse empirique des plates- formes en ligne. Compte tenu de 
la consultation européenne récente dans le but de comprendre (si, ou, plus probablement) la 
façon de réglementer les plates- formes, il est essentiel que les considérations de droit de la 
consommation fassent partie des futurs règlements. Par exemple, il est difficilement acceptable 
que le consommateur agisse dans la conviction que le cocontractant (donc la partie potentiel-
lement responsable) est la plate- forme, alors qu’en réalité, celle- ci décline toute responsabilité 
et prétend être un simple intermédiaire. Après une analyse critique de la proposition législative 
italienne sur les plates- formes et de l’économie collaborative, les articles illustrent le cas d’uti-
lisation de Uber, la plate- forme de covoiturage à 60 milliards de dollars, qui agit à la marge 
des lois en vigueur, ce qui donne lieu à des protestations et des débats autour du monde. Après 
une évaluation de la décision italienne empêchant Uber de fournir le service de UberPop en Ita-
lie, l’examen de ce régime est l’outil idéal pour exposer que le principal motif de préoccupation 
des consommateurs concerne la connaissance de leurs droits et obligations. Cet article traite de 
deux facteurs qui sont à la base de cette difficulté : la multitude des contrats et le labyrinthe 
des entreprises. Dans les conclusions, il sera présenté une proposition pratique ambitieuse, mais 
réalisable. Il sera suggéré de développer une application mobile qui aide les consommateurs à 
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builds on “Ubertrust. What Future for Online Platforms without Trust and Awareness? A Qualita-
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Sousse, 16-18 July 2016. I am thankful to Dr. Luce Jacovella for the precious collaborative work and 
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évaluer la qualité juridique des contrats qu’ils souscrivent dans le but d’accéder aux services 
offerts par la plate- forme. Dans le même temps, cette application, appelée « conscience by 
Design », devrait contribuer à sensibiliser les consommateurs, créant ainsi une masse critique 
et à faire comprendre aux plates- formes que la confiance, la transparence et la responsabilité 
sont des avantages concurrentiels.
This article sheds light on the main consumer law aspects of the sharing economy through an 
empirical analysis of online platforms. Given the recent European consultation with the purpose 
of understanding (whether, or, more likely) how to regulate platforms, it is critical that consumer 
law considerations will be part of future regulations. For instance, it is hardly acceptable that 
the consumer acts in the belief that the contractual party (thus the potentially liable party) is the 
platform, but in reality the former disclaims any responsibility and claims to be a mere intermedi-
ary, which only seldom actually is. After a critical analysis of the Italian legislative proposal on 
platforms and collaborative economy, the articles moves on to illustrate the use case of Uber, the 
$60 billion ride- hailing platform, which is acting at the margin of existing laws, thus giving rise 
to protests and debate around the world. After an assessment of the Italian ruling preventing Uber 
to provide the UberPop service in Italy, the use case is the perfect tool to show the main reasons 
for concern of consumers is the lack of awareness of their rights and obligations. This articles deals 
with two factors of the said lack: the contractual quagmire and the corporate labyrinth. In the 
conclusions, it is presented an ambitious, albeit feasible, practical proposal. It is suggested the 
development of a mobile app that helps the consumers to assess the legal quality of the contracts 
they are entering in order to access the services offered through the platform. At the same time, 
this app, called ‘Awareness by Design’, should contribute to raise awareness in consumers, thus 
creating critical mass and making platforms understand that trust, transparency, and accounta-
bility are competitive advantages.
Introduction
In contemporary consumer law, few topics are as pressing as net neutrality, inter-
mediaries’ liability, the Internet of Things (IoT), and the sharing economy. They are 
different, albeit equally intricate, phenomena, which have in common the prominent 
role of online platforms. Therefore, through this empirical qualitative study on the 
latter, I aspire to shed light also on the former.
Europe has a growing interest for the regulation of platforms to secure trust. For 
instance, the European Commission has launched a comprehensive assessment of the 
role of platforms in the Digital Single Market Strategy. 1 With a consultation closed 
 1 European Commission, com. “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe” COM(2015) 192 final. 
Adopted on 6 May 2015, the strategy includes three pillars and sixteen initiatives that ought to be 
delivered by the end of 2016.
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in January 2016, 2 the Commission has inquired the civil society, businesses, and 
public bodies to whether and how online platforms ought to be regulated. The focus 
of the regulation is consumer protection. Indeed, the consultation covers transpar-
ency, terms of use, ratings and reviews, the use of information by platforms, the 
relation between platforms and their suppliers, and the controversial role of online 
intermediaries. Member States are as active as the Union. 3 For example, the United 
Kingdom and Italy have been collecting evidence to understand if online platforms 
should be more transparent 4 and they have recently published the relevant reports. 5 
France, on the other hand, is about to require them inter alia to provide loyal, clear, 
transparent information about the terms of service (ToS). 6 At any rate, national 
 2 European Commission, Public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, 
online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy, 24  Septem-
ber 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/en/news/public- consultation- regulatory- 
environment- platforms- online- intermediaries- data- and- cloud. All the URLs of this paper have 
been accessed on 24 April 2016. The consultation was subject to many criticism, such as EDRI 
and Access, Key points for a successful consultation on internet platforms, Letter to the European 
Commission, 4  September 2015, https://edri.org/files/platforms_consultation20150904.pdf. 
Cf.  S.  McLean and M.  Samavi, “EC’s consultation on online platforms proves controversial”, 
E- Commerce Law & Policy 2015, 17(12), 6-8.
 3 In this respect, a useful document which has been recently leaked is a joint letter from Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom to the Minister of Economic Affairs of 
The Netherlands in preparation of the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy and Com-
petitiveness Council meetings 26  May 2016. The full text is available at https://regmedia.
co.uk/2016/05/23/dsm- joint- letter.pdf. The fourteen Member States stress that “[a]lternatives 
to regulation should be investigated rather than adding new burdensome regulation of businesses. 
Any regulatory proposals would have to be considered carefully”. It would seem that this view is 
shared by the European Commission.
 4 House of Lords EU Internal Market Sub- Committee, 17  September 2015, www.parliament.
uk/business/committees/committees- a- z/lords- select/eu- internal- market- subcommittee/news- 
parliament- 2015/online- platforms- inquiry- launch, and Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comuni-
cazioni, 11  November 2015, www.agcom.it/documents/10179/2185185/Delibera+357-15- 
CONS/9de98850-5624-404d- ba47-2c8ca6533556?version=1.0.
 5 See House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, 10th Report of Session 2015-2016, Online 
Platforms and the Digital Single Market, April 2016, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf, and Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, 
Allegato A alla delibera n. 165/16/CONS I Consummer Communications Services, May 2016, avail-
able at www.agcom.it/documents/10179/5054337/Allegato+29-6- 2016/9d7168c6-6205-47e7- 
a2d9-23cccdc1df59?version=1.0. However, the latter is just the first of a forthcoming number of 
reports; it is limited to the messaging mobiles apps.
 6 See article 22 of the draft statute on a digital Republic on the “Loyalty of platforms” which amends 
article L. 111-5- 1 of the Code de la consommation (www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/projets/pl3318.
asp). The projet de loi pour une République numérique, output of an extensive online consultation, 
has been adopted by the Assemblée nationale on 26  January 2016 (first reading). The discussion in 
séance publique is set to take place on 26, 27, 28  April and 3  May 2016. The second alinéa of 
article L. 111-5- 1 will read: “tout opérateur de plateforme en ligne est tenu de délivrer au consommateur une 
information loyale, claire et transparente sur les conditions générales d’utilisation du service d’intermédiation 
qu’il propose et sur les modalités de référencement, de classement et de déréférencement des contenus, biens ou 
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attempts to regulate online platforms are countered by the European Commission, 
which points out that “in order for Europe to reap the full benefits from the platform 
economy and stimulate growth in European platform start- ups, self- evidently, there 
cannot be 28 different sets of rules for online platforms in a single market”. 7
If the intricacy of online platform were not sufficient, I have decided to pick, as a use 
case, the most controversial one, that is “Uber”, the ride hailing platform world leader 
of the sharing economy in the transport sector, present in more than 400 cities, to the 
value of $60 billion. 8
Given the focus of European public actors to ensure trust and transparency in 
the online platforms’ ToS and the conclusions of a qualitative study on a domotics 
environment, 9 I explore the role of Uber’s “legals” (ToS, privacy policy, etc.) in buil-
ding the customers’ trust and the role of users’ awareness in supporting Uber’s busi-
ness model.
The study is based on a mixed theoretical and empirical methodology with focus 
on Italy and the United Kingdom. 10 Alongside a literature, legislative, document, 11 
contractual review, I have conducted semi- structured interviews with users of the 
unofficial blog Uberpeople.net and with a Uber customer support agent. Moreover, I 
have carried out unstructured interviews with several Uber drivers and taxi drivers in 
London and in Italy and I have liaised with some of the Members of Parliament of Italy 
responsible for the below- analysed legislative draft on platforms.
services auxquels ce service permet d’accéder. Il fait notamment apparaître clairement l’existence ou non d’une 
relation contractuelle ou de liens capitalistiques avec les personnes référencées, l’existence ou non d’une rémunéra-
tion par lesdites personnes et, le cas échéant, l’impact de celle- ci sur le classement des contenus, biens ou services 
proposés”.
 7 European Commission, communication “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market. Opportuni-
ties and Challenges for Europe”, (COM(2016)288), 25 May 2016, para. 4. For some critical remarks 
see J.  McNamee, “Leaked EU Communication – Part  1: Privatised censorship and surveillance”, 
available at https://edri.org/leaked- eu- communication- privatised- censorship- and- surveillance. See 
also the Staff Working Document and the synopsis report on the results of the public consultation 
(SWD(2016) 172 final).
 8 The source of these data is S. Knight, “How Uber conquered London”, The Guardian 27 April 2016 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/27/how- uber- conquered- london.
 9 G.  Noto La Diega and I.  Walden, “Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into the 
Nest”, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 219/2016, available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2725913, L.S. Kin and Y.Z. Kin (eds.), The Future of Money and Data, Singapore: 
Academy Publishing, 2016, 96-148.
 10 For an analysis of the attempts to regulate Uber in Italy, the UK, Belgium, France, and Germany see 
D. Cadbury et al., “A disruptive influence Regulating Uber and other emerging technologies is not 
easy”, Competition Law Insight, 8 December 2015.
 11 It has been extremely useful to access corporate documents obtainable through the Companies House 
search engine and in Scribd.
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The legals have been accessed a first time on 10 December 2015, a second time on 
28 April 2016.
Platforms are the strong actors of the sharing economy. 12 As observed in a European 
report, the first macro- economic factor driving the growth of the sharing economy is 
“decreased consumer trust in the corporate world as a result of the financial and eco-
nomic crisis”. 13 Therefore, I propose the embedment of trust in design and suggest the 
development of ‘awareness by design’ tools. Indeed, if platforms will not understand 
that trust and awareness are a competitive advantage, the bubble of the sharing eco-
nomy may burst.
I. – Online platforms and consumer protection
Online platforms can be defined as “undertakings that are capable of facilitating 
direct interactions between users via online systems and that capitalise on data- driven 
efficiencies enabled by network effects”. 14 The European Commission points out 
that “the future Internet cannot succeed without trust of users in online platforms.” 15 
Hence, the Commission is committed to develop measures that foster trust, fairness, 
and awareness, especially regarding collection and use of data. In particular, the areas 
that need additional transparency are data collection, “the display of sponsored search 
results, the identification of the actual supplier of services or products, and possible 
misleading practices including fake reviews.” 16 The areas that the Commission iden-
tifies for improvement are ToS that are currently perceived as unfair, the refusal of 
unilaterally- modified market access conditions, the dual role of platforms as supplier 
and competitors of suppliers, unfair “parity clauses” with detrimental effects for the 
consumer, and “lack of transparency notably on platform tariffs, on use of data and on 
search results, which could result in harming suppliers” business activities. 17
The legal issues relevant to online platforms are umpteen; indeed, “legal disruption 
is not an accident of the platform economy, it is a core feature”. 18 One need only 
 12 Cf. I. Graef, “Market definition and market power in data: the case of online platforms”, World Com-
petition 2015, 38(4), 473-505.
 13 K.  Dervodeja et al., The Sharing Economy Accessibility Based Business Models for Peer- to- Peer Markets, 
European Commission Business Innovation Observatory, September 2013.
 14 COM(2016)288, para. 2.
 15 COM(2016)288, para. 5(iii).
 16 Ibid.
 17 Ibid.
 18 A. Strowel and W. Vergote, Fix the Economics First, Then Focus on the Right Regulation, Written evi-
dence (OPL0087), Digital Platforms: To Regulate or Not To Regulate?, http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu- internal- market- subcommittee/
online- platforms- and- the- eu- digital- single- market/written/26643.html.
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consider competition, 19 privacy and data protection, 20 contracts, 21 intellectual prop-
erty, 22 employment law 23 and criminal law. 24
This article focuses on the private ordering by platforms and the ways to protect 
consumers. 25
 19 Given the dominant position of the main platforms in the relevant market and the network effect they 
can leverage, many practices as tie- in, could lead to lock- in and, more generally, be considered abu-
sive. See www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323324904579041300287558882 for a graph 
of the relationship between Amazon and the other eCommerce platforms. Given the common busi-
ness model whereby the user access the platform for free, it is complicated to measure the damage 
to the consumer in pecuniary terms; as noted by A. Strowel, “Vers une régulation des plates- formes 
internet?”, Journal de droit européen, juin 2015, 225: “c’est la diminution du choix laissé aux consommateurs 
qui détermine le potentiel dommage”. For some considerations from a European competition law perspec-
tive, see G. Lougher and S. Kalmanowicz, “EU competition law in the sharing economy”, Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice 2016, 7(2), 87-102; D. Zimmer and M. Blaschczok, “Most- 
favoured- customer clauses and two- sided platforms”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
2014, 5(4), 187-195; I.  Graef, “Market definition and market power in data: the case of online 
platforms”, op. cit. For a US law & economics point of view see D.S. Evans, “Attention rivalry among 
online platforms”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2013, 9(2), 313-357. A specific application is 
provided by T. Hoppner, “Defining markets for multi- sided platforms: the case of search engines”, 
World Competition 2015, 38(3), 349-366.
 20 For instance, cross- platform tracking, encryption, lack of clarity on information inputs and out-
puts, etc. Cf. G. Schmid and T. Gausling, “Data protection and the right of personality with regard 
to rating platforms: decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court”, Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice 2016, 11(1), 46-48.
 21 Some contractual issues related to online platforms are lack of awareness of the other contracting 
party, distance sales, asymmetry, etc.
 22 For instance, machine learning algorithms, geo- blocking, user- generated content, etc. I have dealt 
with intellectual property and cloud platforms in G. Noto La Diega, “Le idee e il muro del suono. I 
programmi per elaboratore nella più recente giurisprudenza europea”, Europa e diritto privato 2013, II, 
543-596. For some specific perspectives see C. Casalonga and A. Gevorkian, “The liability battle 
over online video- sharing platforms”, Intellectual Property Magazine 2012, Sep, 44-45; T. Basheer and 
W. Smith, “The impact of new streaming platforms on music and IP”, E- Commerce Law & Policy 2015, 
17(7), 15-16; M. Ferrante, “E- commerce platforms: liability for trade mark infringement reflections 
on Chinese courts’ practice and remedies against the sale of counterfeits on the internet”, Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 2015, 10(4), 255-261; P. Goldstein, “Future platforms for copy-
right licensing”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2015, 46(2), 153-154; 
L. Scaife, “A game of two halves: the issues presented by trading standards law when exploiting image 
rights via social media platforms”, Entertainment Law Review 2013, 24(4), 120-124.
 23 For instance, the issues related to digital labour and the qualification of the workers as “users” to 
circumvent the employees protections.
 24 It is interesting the analysis of multi- player online games and (even child) pornography enabled by vir-
tual reality techniques (VR), as carried out in T. Hoeren, “The European liability and responsibility 
of providers of online- platforms such as ‘Second Life’”, Journal of Information, Law & Technology 2009, 
1. For other criminal law aspects, cf. A. Fong, “Dissemination of libel by online social platforms: 
reinterpreting laws to meet the information age”, International Company and Commercial Law Review 
2014, 25(2), 39-44; Z. Akhtar, “Malicious communications, media platforms and legal sanctions”, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 2014, 20(6), 179-187.
 25 There are many issues that are not strictly of consumer law, but can nevertheless affect consumers. 
These aspects will not be covered in this study. See, e.g., J. Craughan, D. Palmer and E. Reid, 
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My previous research on the IoT 26 has shown inter alia how critical is the role of plat-
forms and how the terms of service, privacy policies, end- user licenses agreements, 
intellectual property notices, acceptable user policies, warranties, etc. (collectively 
the “legals”) are filling the gaps left behind by legislation. In addition, they are doing so 
in an inconsistent, opaque, and often unenforceable way.
This can be described as private ordering. I do not mean simple compliance with 
agreements, or the abuse of contracts in order to elude the law. 27 One form of 
response to technological developments resulting in regulatory lacunae is the use of 
contracts. As a consequence, looking at the contracts (or more generally at the “legals”) 
is an inevitable requirement for showing how law operates in the environment of plat-
forms. Indeed, the European, British, and Italian consultations on platforms men-
tioned above rightly focus on transparency, terms of use, ratings and reviews, the use 
of information by platforms, the relation between platforms and their suppliers.
Consumers can be harmed by the platforms’ behavior in many ways. As the Euro-
pean Commission put it in the Digital Single Market Strategy, concerns about the 
growing market power of platforms include “a lack of transparency as to how they use 
the information they acquire, their strong bargaining power compared to that of their 
clients, which may be reflected in their terms and conditions”. 28 Studying the relevant 
legals, therefore, should shed light on the features of such imbalance and opaqueness. 
It will also help to understand the state of the art of consumer protection on some 
vital issues such as data portability, switching costs, remedies in case of discontinuity 
of services, unfair commercial practices, unfair terms, takedown arrangements, etc.
More generally, there is a “lack of awareness of consumers about the value and use of their 
data”, 29 through business models that transform them in unwitting labourers. 30 A consumer 
can have the impression of contracting with the platform, whereas in fact another consumer 
may provide the service; consequently, consumers may believe that they are entitled to 
consumer law remedies, which do not apply to consumer- to- consumer (C2C) relations.
“Online lending platforms and securitisation: bringing the wholesale market to the individual”, But-
terworths Journal of International Banking & Financial Law 2015, 30(6), 348-352 and W. Maycock and 
C. Hill, “New rules enhance clarity for platforms and users”, Compliance Monitor 2013, Jun, 14-15.
 26 See, for instance, G. Noto La Diega, The British perspectives on the Internet of Things. The Clouds of 
Things- Health use case, in Internet of Things: Legal Issues and Challenges towards a Hyperconnected World, ed. 
Centre for Law & Public Utilities of the Seoul National University, 2015, 45-99; G. Noto La Diega 
and I. Walden, “Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into the Nest”, op. cit.
 27 For a range of possible meanings of “private ordering” see D. Castle (ed.), The Role of Intellectual Pro-
perty Rights in Biotechnology Innovation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009, 312, especially notes 42-44.
 28 European Commission, com. “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe”, op. cit., 3.3.1.
 29 Commission Staff Working Document, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe – Analysis and Evidence 
Accompanyng, COM(2015) 192 final, SWD(2015) 100 final, 6.5.2015, 4.5.
 30 D. Cardon and A. Casilli, Qu’est- ce que le Digital Labor?, INA, Bry- sur- Marne, 2015, for instance, 
see the activity of posting as a job that deserves to be remunerated.
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Another factor that can affect protection is ownership. More and more commonly, 
goods are offered “as a service”, rented instead of sold; in addition, the devices of 
the IoT are an inseparable mixture of hardware, software, and services. 31 Therefore, 
even when a user can claim ownership of the hardware component, it cannot do so 
with regard to the software or service elements. Along with the fact that property is 
accompanied by a wide range of strong remedies, ownership can affect also consumer 
protection for instance insofar as some consumer laws apply only if the subject has a 
general property right in the contractual object. 32
Also the corporate structure can act as a disclaimer. The Uber use case, analysed 
below, confirms this. Indeed, I asked the customer care of Uber UK what are the legals 
that I have to read if I want to be a driver. They replied that general User Terms & Con-
ditions apply to the drivers, whereas an inquiry made through an unofficial forum led 
me to find the contractual documents, where I found out that British drivers negotiate 
with the Dutch Uber B.V. (which is the reason, I believe, for the reported silence).
One has to say, however, that the European Commission seems to reduce the 
problem of consumer protection to the issue of “sufficient information”. 33 There is 
the high risk that imposing obligations of information on the platforms, one merely 
overwhelms the consumers with too much of information. The way forward is not 
an overload of information: platforms should be required to use design and existing 
technologies (predictive analytics, deep learning,  etc.) in order to provide less and 
clearer information. The silver lining of the bulk tracking carried out by many compa-
nies could be that, at least, since they know the users and predict their behavior, they 
can find the better ways to catch their attention on the most sensitive sections of the 
agreement they are entering into.
Let us observe what the respondents to the European consultation think, since one 
should expect that the future relevant European acts would build on these responses. 34
 31 This is the thesis of G. Noto La Diega and I. Walden, “Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: 
Looking into the Nest”, op. cit.
 32 I have started exploring this aspect in G. Noto La Diega, “Clouds of Things. Data protection and 
consumer law at the intersection of cloud computing and the Internet of Things”, forthcoming in 
Journal of Law and Economic Regulation. For instance, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 does not apply if 
being supplied, the goods are not owned by the consumer and ownership is “the general property in 
goods, not merely a special property” (ss. 4-5).
 33 In the page of the Commission’s website dedicated to online platforms (https://ec.europa.
eu/digital- single- market/en/online- platforms- digital- single- market), the question of consumers is 
limited to whether platforms provide sufficient information and safeguards to consumers and to the 
issue of digital content reuse where they act on their own behalf, or on behalf of their suppliers.
 34 “First brief results of the public consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, 
online intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy”, 26  January 
2016, https://ec.europa.eu/digital- single- market/en/news/first- brief- results- public- consultation- 
regulatory- environment- platforms- online- intermediaries.
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Of the 1036  replies, 35 the largest number of responses came from Germany 
(17%), Belgium (13%) and the United Kingdom (11%), with 49% coming from other 
24  Member States and 10% outside the European Union (mostly from the United 
Kingdom). Most of the responses came from individual citizens (411), organizations 
representing businesses (195), and businesses, including suppliers using platforms to 
provide services (124), and online platforms (42).
There is a clear interest for platforms (the relevant section is the one that has 
received more replies) and there is consensus on their positive potential. Indeed, a 
large majority of citizens and of businesses recognised the benefits of online platforms, 
mainly because platforms increase accessibility of information, ease of communica-
tion, business opportunities and choice of products and services.
In turn, a most respondents are aware of the downside of platforms. Either they 
have encountered, or they are aware of problems faced by consumers or suppliers 
when dealing with online platforms.
Transparency seems to be a primary concern. The majority of businesses and 
citizens affirmed that platforms should be more transparent about search results, 
about the actual supplier and about reviews mechanisms. Moreover, there is insuf-
ficient information on personal and non- personal data collected and on their terms 
and conditions. Unsurprisingly, most online platforms think they provide suffi-
cient information. It is striking that in the final and separate section on the collab-
orative economy, the results are completely different. Indeed, most consumers 
take the view that collaborative economy platforms provide sufficient information 
on service providers, consumer rights, characteristics of the provision and statu-
tory rights. This could be due to the smaller number of responses or to some bias. 
For instance, I may imagine that non- collaborative platforms have not that ideo-
logical allure of the collaborative ones; therefore, consumers may tend to trust 
the latter more easily.
Finally, most citizens and online platforms observe that the above problems should 
be addressed by a combination of regulatory solutions, self- regulatory and market 
dynamics. Responses from businesses were evenly divided between purely regulatory 
measures and a combination of market dynamics, self- regulatory and regulatory meas-
ures. It is not clear the role of co- regulation and business models, but this depends on 
the formulation of the question.
 35 An additional 10599  individual contributions were received via one single advocacy association, 
mostly addressing only some of the questions posed in the consultation. They are not taken into 
account in the preliminary findings, however it strikes that one single association has been capable to 
involve such a higher quantity of people. This suggests that the European Commission should change 
its communication strategy, if it wants to build its policy on a sound empirical basis.
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The question of liability is essentially focused on the suitability of the rules set forth 
by the eCommerce directive 36 and the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
Views are divided among those who consider the current liability regime still fit for 
purpose and those who request clarification and guidance for its implementation, or a 
rebalancing of interests, including the establishment of further categories of interme-
diary services, besides mere conduit, caching, and hosting.
The European Commission will not take a one- size- fits- all approach. Indeed, it is 
pointed out “any future regulatory measures proposed at EU level only address clearly 
identified problems relating to a specific type or activity of online platforms in line 
with better regulation principles”. 37 Moreover, “principles- based self- regulatory/co- 
regulatory measures […] can play a role”. 38
Now, a large majority of consumers and businesses complain about regulatory issues 
and other obstacles to the development of the sharing economy. Uncertainty as to the 
users’ and providers’rights and obligations is a key hindrance that risks to jeopardise 
the collaborative economy. Therefore, let us have a look at one of the first attempts to 
regulate online platforms in the European Union.
II. – The Italian proposed legislation on online platforms
Italy is likely to be in one of the most advanced positions in matters of online plat-
forms, 39 via a hard law ad- hoc solution.
On 27 January 2016, some members of the lower house of the Parliament of Italy 
(“Camera dei Deputati”) have presented a draft statute on online platforms for the shar-
ing of goods and services and on the promotion of the sharing economy (proposta di 
legge n.  3564, “Disciplina delle piattaforme digitali per la condivisione di beni e servizi e 
disposizioni per la promozione dell’economia della condivisione”). On 29 March 2016, the 
proposta has been assigned to the parliamentary committees on transport and produc-
tion (Commissioni riunite IX Trasporti e X Attività Produttive), which will have to debate on 
each article and the whole text and transmit it to the Camera alongside a report, after 
 36 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Mar-
ket (“Directive on electronic commerce”).
 37 COM(2016)288, para. 4.
 38 Ibid.
 39 One has to point out that platforms, which are intermediaries between professional traders and 
consumers (therefore registered in the registro delle imprese) are out of the scope of the proposta. 
Consequently, it does not apply to Uber in Italy. There, Uber drivers must have the same authori-
sation required to private drivers (noleggio con conducente, vehicle hire with driver). Unlike cab 
drivers, Uber drivers cannot wait for clients on the street: the transport service has to be previously 
booked and the waiting has to take place in an ad- hoc garage.
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acquiring the opinion of eight parliamentary committees. On 3 May 2016, the Commis-
sioni have started examining the text.
The purpose of the draft statute is to foster the sharing economy and to ensure 
transparency, tax fairness, fair competition, and consumer protection. As to the lat-
ter, the preamble clarifies that the focus is on security, health, privacy, and transpar-
ency of the ToS.
The first important provision attributes new powers to the antitrust authority 
(“Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato”, hereinafter AGCM), which will reg-
ulate and monitor digital platforms (only those subsumable under the “sharing econ-
omy” label, it would seem). The new powers are financially supported by the con-
trolled entities through the payment of a sum non exceeding the 0,08 per mille of 
the last turnover. The AGCM keeps the free and open access register of the online 
platforms for the digital economy (“Registro elettronico nazionale delle piattaforme digitali 
dell’economia della condivisione”) and can oblige the platforms to take out insurance to 
face the typical risks of the sharing economy. If a platform operates without being in 
the registro, the AGCM issues an injunction to suspend the activity and who does not 
follow the order can be fined up to the 25% of the annual turnover.
The remedial array is noteworthy. Alongside the said fine, there is a legal presump-
tion of abuse of economic dependence under legge 18 June 1998, no. 192, 40 when the 
platform and the utente operatore (who provides the service or shares the good) agree 
to refuse the provision of services to current or potential customers under terms that 
are better than the ones offered to the platform. This comma (subsection) goes with 
proviso “ingiustificatamente”, which means that the platform can rebut the presumption 
by proving that there is a just cause for refusing the said better terms.
Another important provision accompanied by a remedy is Article 4, providing the duty 
to keep a business policy (“Documento di politica aziendale”) that has to conform to the 
opinion expressed by the AGCM and, anyway, finally approved by the authority. The 
documento cannot provide or purport to provide, directly or indirectly, e.g. that the utente 
operatore can contract exclusively or under better terms with the platform; the moni-
toring of the provision of the end- service; mandatory tariffs; the exclusion of the utente 
operatore from the platform (or its penalisation) on non- serious or subjective grounds; 
the complimentary irrevocable transfer of the utente operatore’s copyright; the ban, for 
the said user, to acquire and use the platform’s public information that is not protected 
by adequate technological measures of protection; the duty to advertise the platform’s 
 40 Cf., on the legal basis of the domestic legislation, Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty. On the non- sectorial scope of the provision see Corte di Cassazione, ordinanza, 
25 November 2011, no. 24906, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata, I, 2012, 298.
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services; the prohibition of critical comments from the utente operatore to the platform; 
the sharing of information with kindred users; the duty to allow the transfer of personal 
data to third parties.
The AGCM has the obscure power to invite who violates Article 4 to act according 
to the said provision. Now, the documento has to be previously approved by the author-
ity. Therefore, the current wording of the provision seems to limit its applicability to 
the unlikely scenario where the platform operates without the documento. It should pro-
vided, in turn, a remedy for the more likely event that, once approved the documento, the 
behaviour of the platform is not consistent with it. Another option is to state openly that 
the documento has contractual nature, and therefore the ordinary remedies for the breach 
of contract apply. Anyway, the current fine would be a sum amounting up to 10% of 
the last turnover, plus the suspension of the service until the platform does not fulfil its 
obligations.
The civil remedy is that the inconsistent sections are void and the nullity does not 
affect the entire contract. Now, once a judge declares the sections to be void, the con-
tract risks not be enforceable any longer, notwithstanding the provision that saves it. 
Therefore, the parties will have to renegotiate it and one has to imagine – even though 
the proposta is silent on the point – that the document will have to undergo again the 
approval of the AGCM.
If one wanted to point out other criticisms, they could underline how the focus on 
the service provider is not minimally outset by a similar protection of the end- user. It 
can be argued that sometimes small businesses, dependent on the power of big plat-
forms, are as weak as the consumers. Even if this was the case, there is no justification 
for such an imbalance.
Minor remarks may regard the limitation to copyright, whilst also trade marks, 
designs, and patents may be at stake. By the by, the ToS usually do not provide the 
transfer of intellectual property rights, but the exclusive license with right to sub- 
license, which has basically the same effects of an assignment. Finally, rigidly pre-
venting the utente operatore from agreeing to advertise the platform’s service might be 
considered a paternalistic option.
The last notable provision regards data protection and privacy and its violation is 
fined with a sum of up to €30.000. It is much peculiar that “user data” are defined not 
only with reference to personal data in the sense of the decreto legislativo 30 June 2003, 
no. 196 (Code of privacy), 41 but also with the data produced by and resulting from the 
 41 The codice della privacy, lately amended by the decreto legislativo 14 September 2015, no. 151, consti-
tutes implementation of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data and of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CONSUMER LAW – REVUE EUROPÉENNE DE DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION
394 n  2015/2
395
digital integration of objects, that is, expressly, the IoT. One may infer, thus, that the 
IoT data would not by default fall under the personal data category, which is not the 
case. 42 At the same time, one could think that user data are protected when originating 
from the IoT even when they are not personal. Given the large amount of data flowing 
between such devices (big data), protecting non- personal data could prove to be non- 
feasible or cumbersome for the service providers.
If the platform intends to transmit the users’ personal data, it has to inform them pre-
viously on how and when the data will be transmitted and allowing the users to erase 
their data. Now, if the platform outsources, say, cloud storage and redundancy, would 
the relevant transfer need to be communicated each time beforehand? It does not seem 
sensible or even feasible. Let us imagine the user receiving a notification every time its 
data are transmitted. Or let us think to the flow of data slowed down by the system of 
prior notification. Moreover, it is not clear why the remedy available to the users is to 
erase the data, and not to deny the consent to the transfer. Furthermore, it would be 
more important to know the purpose of the transfer, rather than the time or the means.
The Italy Data Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, here-
inafter “Garante”) will regulate this mechanism, but a past experience can teach us 
something. As from 2 June 2015, websites have to inform users about the use of cook-
ies and ask for their consent. 43 It is common experience that these notices are not 
user- friendly, especially in the mobile version they impede the user from accessing the 
content and, what is more important, they do not leave any actual freedom to decide 
if to consent or not, since they are usually based on the assumption that the use of the 
service equals the consent to the processing of data.
The draft law, then, imposes on platforms obligations to enable the users to double- 
check, edit, delet, erase, and access their data with a high degree of granularity. Moreo-
ver, they shall be entitled to erase all the data of the users’ profiles through a single input.
Finally, it is not allowed to analyse automatically the content of the users’ data, of the doc-
uments and of the messages texted by the users. One could infer, thus, that non- automated 
analysis is allowed, which may mean every analysis that is not carried out via bots and sim-
ilar tools. The provision goes with the proviso of the operations spontaneously demanded 
by the users and subject to an ad- hoc contractual approval. The refusal to agree (were not 
the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy 
in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications). See 
now the general data protection regulation (infra, note 116).
 42 Cf., e.g., UK Government Chief Scientific Officer, The Internet of Things: making the most of the 
Second Digital Revolution, 18 December 2014. 
 43 See Garante per la protezione dei dati personali, provvedimento 8 May 2014, no. 229 “Simplified Arrange-
ments to Provide Information and Obtain Consent Regarding Cookies”. Cf. The Privacy and Electro-
nic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.
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they spontaneously requested by the users?) shall not bring prejudice to the full access to the 
service. It would seem, but the provision is not straightforward, that the automated analysis 
of data is allowed in the context of operations requested by the user itself. When one launch 
the Uber app to request a car, are they spontaneously requesting an operation? So it would 
seem. Should they enter a new contract every time they launch the app?
Most importantly, it would have been better to dedicate an ad- hoc comma or even 
article to one of the main problems of Internet consumer transactions. I mean the fact, 
confirmed by the Uber use case, that consumers have absolutely no bargaining power. 
If they do not agree with the terms imposed by the business (be it the platform or the 
final provider), they have only one choice: leave immediately the platform and not to 
access the service.
Overall, it may be a good law, but there is an excessive focus on the business user of 
platforms (utente operatore), and a limited attention for the consumer, touched only by 
the provision on data protection. Besides, the proliferation of sector- specific isolated 
laws does not seem to be the best policy option. Probably, some amendments to the 
code of consumers 44 (for the B2C relations) and the law on the economic dependence 45 
(for the B2b ones) would be preferable.
III. – The legal controversy revolving around Uber
Uber is a user- to- user drivers’ service mediated by an online platform. Even though 
low- cost real- time ridesharing startups such as Lyft and Sidecar are spreading, Uber is 
still the main actor at a global level and the economic and social transformation that has 
followed, has taken the name of “Uberification”. 46 Recent evidence has been provided 
in mid- April 2016 by the fact that, in the span of 24 hours, Universal and Fox have paid 
several millions to develop two Uber- themed comedies. 47
The platform’s ToS configure the relationships between Uber and the users (drivers- 
partners, riders, business users), as well as the relationship between the users. The 
 44 Decreto legislativo, 6  September 2005, no.  206, codice del consumo, as recently amended by decreto 
legislativo 15 January 2016, no. 8.
 45 Supra, note 28.
 46 On 24 February 2015, the term has entered the French Wiktionary, which now defines it as the 
adoption of a commerce model where one provides resources to the clients via their smartphones 
on demand and real- time. However, the wording “uberisation” is more common in France. For some 
legal issues related to the “uberification”, see N. Syed, “Regulating Uberification”, Computer and Tele-
communications Law Review, 2016, 22(1), 14-25.
 47 T. Siegel and B. Kit, “Hollywood Studios Race to Release Uber Themed- Comedies”, The Hollywood 
Reporter 20 April 2016 (9 April of the hard copy), www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/competing- 
uber- themed- comedies- works- 885647.
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 latter is particularly relevant for determining how trust is built and sustained. The 
focus on users’ awareness is an essential feature for the development of online plat-
forms through a non- paternalistic regulation. 48
Uber is facing lawsuits and protests all around the world. 49 Taxi drivers argue that 
Uber’s competition is an unfair one and that all the drivers should be bound to taxi 
regulations. 50 Drivers would like to be paid more fairly 51 and, most importantly, 
treated as employees, rather than independent contractors 52 (with a suit settled on 
21 April 2016 for US$100 million). 53 In turn, riders claim that the platform should be 
 48 C.  Blackman et al., Towards a future Internet: Interrelations between technological, social and economic 
trends, Final Report for DG Information Society and Media, November 2010, http://cordis.europa.
eu/fp7/ict/fire/docs/tafi- final- report_en.pdf.
 49 Cf., for instance, S. Barratt and J. Morgan, “Uber and above?”, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 
2016, 61(3), 26-27; N. Brown, “Uber: TfL and the taxonomy of taximeters”, Computers & Law 2015, 
25(4), 23-26; N. Syed, “The rise of Uberification: getting the go- ahead in London” Practical Law Com-
panies, 2015, 26(10); J. van der Luit- Drummond, “Defining a driver as an employee or a ‘partner’”, 
Solicitors Journal 2015, 159(30), 8; F. Heinemann and M. Shume, “Uber, Airbnb, Netflix... Austra-
lia’s steps to tax the sharing and digital economies”, T.P.I.I.T. 2015, 13(7), 13-15; V. Barnett and 
L. Tomlinson, “The Uber app: the legal background to the outrage”, E- Commerce Law & Policy 2014, 
16(10), 8.
 50 See, e.g., the protest of taxi drivers in Budapest on 26 April 2016 and in Rio de Janeiro on 1 April 
2016. Below, I will analyse an Italian case regarding the qualification of Uber services as taxies.
 51 Whereas according to the company, Uber drivers earn more than $100,000, it has been estimated 
that they actually earn $8.77 per hour after expenses. Cf. D. Macmillan, “Uber Cuts Deals to Lower 
Car Costs”, The Wall Streets Journal Blog, 25 November 2013, and C. O’Donovan and J. Singer- 
Vine, “How Much Uber Drivers Actually Make Per Hour”, BuzzFeed, 23 June 2016.
 52 On 3 June 2015, in Uber Technologies, Inc., v Barbara Berwick (15-546378), the California Labor Commis-
sion has qualified the drivers- Uber relationship as employment and has therefore ordered the defendant 
to pay plaintiff the sum of $4.152,20, pursuant to Labor Code § 2802 and § 2802(b). The order is avai-
lable at www.scribd.com/doc/268946016/Uber- v- Berwick. The platform has replied that “[t]he Cali-
fornia Labor Commission’s ruling is non- binding and applies to a single driver. Indeed it is contrary to a 
previous ruling by the same commission, which concluded in 2012 that the driver ‘performed services 
as an independent contractor, and not as a bona fide employee’. Five other states have also come to 
the same conclusion” (J. Crook, “Uber Driver Deemed Employee By California Labor Commission”, 
TechCrunch 17 June 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2015/06/17/uber- drivers- deemed- employees- by- 
california- labor- commission/#.54akta:pR7C). Uber appealed the commissioner’s ruling in state court 
and argued that Berwick’s dispute belonged in arbitration. On 21 September 2015, A San Francisco 
state judge decided that Uber could not force Ms Berwick into arbitration, being the relevant clause 
unenforceable. Uber drivers are employees also in Douglas O’Connor et al v Uber Technologies, Inc, et al 
(C- 13-3826 EMC) of 31 March 2015 (see also the orders issued by US District Judge Edward M. Chen, 
in the same case, on 1 September 2015 and 9 December 2015). This issue is not limited to Uber, 
but it regards at least several platforms for on- demand services, as reported by D. Alba, “Even More 
Labor Complaints Filed Against On- Demand Companies”, Wired 24 September 2015, www.wired.
com/2015/09/doordash- grubhub- caviar- labor- suits. On the problem of increasing arbitration and 
employment see J.  Silver- Greenberg and R.  Gebeloff, “Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice”, The New York Times 31 October 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/ 
dealbook/arbitration- everywhere- stacking- the- deck- of- justice.html?_r=0. 
 53 See Growing and growing up, 21 April 2016, https://newsroom.uber.com/growing- and- growing- up. 
In exchange of the status of independent contracts, drivers will receive $84  million and, sub-
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responsible for the drivers’ behaviour. 54 Moreover, questions of misleading commer-
cial practices, 55 tax issues, 56 and insurance questions 57 are not uncommon. Indeed, it 
is impossible to foresee all the potential legal and regulatory issues involved when it 
comes to Uber. 58
Recently, Uber has carried out a rebranding strategy (e.g. the shift from the black- 
and- white “U” icon, to the bit- like square), reportedly for developing new products, 
thus attracting new customers. 59 Mischievous commentators may think that this 
change is aimed to use the brand to provide new services, without evoking the contro-
versies revolving around Uber.
It is impossible to take into account all the disputes somehow affecting 60 the trans-
port platform, therefore, I will give brief account only of the Italian ruling(s) against 
“Uberpop”. 61 The conclusions, as will be soon clear, are rather different from those 
of Transport for London v Uber London Ltd, 62 where the app was not qualified as a taxi-
sequently, $16  million if Uber goes public. The settlement regards the O’Connor case and Hakan 
Yucesoy et al v Uber Technologies, Travis Kalanick, and Ryan Graves (4:15- cv- 00262- EMC). On the issue 
of the qualification as an employee see, e.g., J.  van der Luit- Drummond, “Defining a driver as 
an employee or a ‘partner’”, Solicitors Journal 2015, 159(30), 8. More generally on the decline of 
employment contracts (with express reference to Uber), see S. Nesbitt, “Is employment becoming 
obsolete?”, Employment Law Journal 2016, 169(Apr), 14-16.
 54 On the topic of liability see S. Barratt and J. Morgan, “Uber and above?”, Journal of the Law Society 
of Scotland 2016, 61(3), 26-27. 
 55 Cf., for instance, C&R, “Uber under threat of ban in France and at home for breach of regulations”, 
Compliance & Risk 2015, 4(4), 1,15.
 56 Cf. F. Heinemann and M. Shume, “Uber, Airbnb, Netflix... Australia’s steps to tax the sharing and 
digital economies”, T.P.I.I.T. 2015, 13(7), 13-15.
 57 See, e.g., F. Nyman, “Innovation Uber allies”, Post Magazine 2015, May 14, 28-30.
 58 For a first recon, cf. N. Syed, “Regulating Uberification”, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 
2016, 22(1), 14-25; from some insight in the company and the work of its in- house department see 
K. Dowell, “Along for the ride”, Lawyer 2016, 30(8), 12-13.
 59 J. Hempel, “The inside story of Uber’s radical rebranding”, Wired 2 February 2016, www.wired.
com/2016/02/the- inside- story- behind- ubers- colorful- redesign/?mbid=nl_ozy.
 60 There are many disputes that can indirectly affect Uber. See, for instance, Patrick Cotter et al. v Lyft, Inc, 
et al, case no. 3:13- cv- 04065, available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2796429/
Chhabria- Rejection.pdf.
 61 Tribunale di Milano, Sezione specializzata in materia di impresa “A”, ordinanza, 25  May 2015, 
available at www.giureta.unipa.it/Trib_Milano_25052015.pdf and Tribunale di Milano, Sezione 
specializzata in materia di impresa “A”, ordinanza, 2  July 2015 (the appeal, reclamo), available at 
www.dimt.it/wp- content/uploads/2015/07/ordinanza- su- reclamo- Uber.pdf. There is a another 
(unpublished) order, where Judge Marina Tavassi, President of the deciding court, has rejected the 
claim with which Uber asked the suspension of the blocking of the app, while one waited for the final 
decision on the reclamo. For a deeper analysis of the first case, see D. Surdi, “Concorrenza sleale 
e nuove forme di trasporto condiviso: il Tribunale di Milano inibisce ‘UberPop’”, Rivista di Diritto 
dell’Economia, dei Trasporti e dell’Ambiente 2015, 375.
 62 Transport for London v Uber London Ltd and others [2015] All ER (D) 137 (Oct). Cf. V. Barnett and 
L. Tomlinson, “The Uber app: the legal background to the outrage”, E- Commerce Law & Policy 2014, 
16(10), 8; N. Syed, “The rise of Uberification: getting the go- ahead in London” Practical Law Compa-
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meter, thus saving Uber and its drivers from the alleged violation of the Private Hire 
Vehicles (London) Act 1998 s.11(1).
The taxi companies of Milan, Turin, Genoa, some taxi drivers, and some taxi 
trade unions sought an interim prohibitory injunction (inibitoria in via cautelare under 
art. 700 of the code of civil procedure) against Uber International B.V., Uber Inter-
national Holding B.V., Uber B.V., Raiser Operations B.V., Uber Italy s.r.l. and the 
Uber driver who used Uberpop in violation of the administrative regulations on pri-
vate hire. They were asking the blocking of Uber website and app in order to prevent 
them to provide the Uberpop service.
According to the claimants, the provision of taxi- like services without conforming to 
the taxi regulations would constitute unfair competition under art. 2598 no. 3 of the 
civil code, 63 since Uber drivers and the company itself do not have to bear the costs 
attached to the said administrative regulation. In order to obtain an interim injunction, 
it is necessary to prove the periculum in mora, which in the case is the damage to good-
will deriving from the likelihood that the end- users will pick Uber over the traditional 
taxi out of cost- effectiveness reasons. The diversion of profits would have been even 
greater, given the concurrence of Milan Expo 2015.
The defendants asked the dismissal of the action and, in the alternative, a limitation 
of the effects of the injunction to the Uberpop service and to the requests arriving from 
devices located in Italy. It will shown below the importance of the intricate corporate 
structure of Uber, but this dispute anticipates the issues, since the defendants claimed 
the lack of locus standi for Uber Italy s.r.l., Uber International B.V., and Uber Inter-
national Holding B.V. Allegedly, the first is a mere consultancy, the international ones 
would not be involved in the service. The defendants maintain that it is not a taxi- like 
scenario, it is a new concept, a collaborative community where private citizens share 
their goods to lower the relevant costs, as well as the environmental impact. The plat-
form would have the exclusive goal of enabling a more efficient sharing in a context 
of private transport. Some differences. Uber drivers can decide not to accept a ride 
request, which is inhibited to cab drivers. The former, together with the end- users/
riders, are part of a closed community, 64 whereas taxi drivers offer a service to the 
public. Uber drivers, finally, gain a mere reimbursement of the travel expenses and 
the relevant costs, whereas taxi drivers receive a remuneration through a system of 
nies, 2015, 26(10); N. Brown, “Uber: TfL and the taxonomy of taximeters”, Computers & Law 2015, 
25(4), 23-26; P. Brown, “Public law update”, CILEx Journal, 2016, Jan, 28; LGL, “Uber app ‘lawful’ 
High Court rules”, Local Government Lawyer 2015, Oct 16.
 63 The said provision considers unfair competition the behaviour of who makes use of means contrary 
to the professional diligence and capable of damaging other undertakings.
 64 If it were a closed community, it would be growing incredibly fast. Let us just say that every week 
in London thirty thousand people download Uber app and book a ride for the first time. The source 
of these data is S. Knight, “How Uber conquered London”, op. cit.
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public tariffs. The consequence would be that the relationship between Uber and the 
users (both drivers and riders) is an atypical contract under art. 1322 of the civil code, 
not a public transport service, falling under the relevant public regime. Moreover, 
there would be no unfair competition, since this could not automatically follow from 
the violation of the said public regime (operations depending on public licences) and, 
anyway, the taxi drivers could offer discounts and prices below the tariffs. Further-
more, the action of the claimants would be contrary to the freedom of enterprise 
(art. 41 of the Costituzione) and the European competition freedoms, therefore, the 
current domestic legal system should be interpreted in an evolutive way.
Once clarified that the current public regime is consistent with the European treaties 
(the freedom of enterprise can be limited for public policy reasons), the Tribunale di 
Milano moves to assess if there is a relationship of competition between Uber and the 
taxies. The conclusion is that Uber actually interferes with the taxi service, because the 
mechanism of the app is similar to “radio taxi” and, through the ‘surge’ pricing system, 
Uber drivers do not receive a mere reimbursement of the expenses, it is a proper 
payment, along the lines of the one received by cab drivers. It is held immaterial that 
the former do not have to accept the riders’ requests, while it is maintained that the 
purpose of Uber is to provide a more cost- effective alternative to taxies.
The Tribunale, then, considers irrelevant the alleged private character (of the com-
munity, and thus) of the service. Whoever wants to ride a Uber car, needs only to 
download an app. At any rate, the existence of a community does not lead to the legal-
ity of a private car offering the transport service to people “in piazza” (in the streets) 
without the licence required by art. 8 of the legge 15 January 1992, no. 21. 65 It is, 
anyway, a private car used by third parties under art. 82 of the codice della strada.
It is, then, noteworthy the rejection of the ground whereby Uber would represent 
a new concept of private sharing for purposes of cost reduction and environmental 
impact. The Tribunale draws a line between the proper car sharing (à la BlaBlaCar) and 
phenomena such as Uber. With car and ride sharing, the driver has to go from A to B 
and shares the costs of petrol and toll, whereas an Uber driver has not an own interest in 
going from A to B, and he rider pays a proper fare. Moreover, the defendants fall short 
in proving the effect of reduction of environmental impact. In turn, Uber may stimulate 
a more intensive use of private cars, rather than public transport, bicycles, etc.
Is Uber a mere intermediary? The activity carried out by Uber drivers fall under the 
public law regime imposed to taxi drivers. However, the former are undertake merely 
the factual and final behaviour that is prohibited by the law. Indeed, the defendants are 
 65 Art. 86 of the codice della strada (code of road traffic, decreto legislativo 30 April 1992, no. 285) 
refers to art. 8 of the legge 15 January 1992, no. 21 (“Legge quadro no. 3 of the ccodice civile.per il 
trasporto di persone mediante autoservizi pubblici non di linea”, on taxi and private hire vehicles).
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aware that their drivers have no licence, and without the organisation they have crea-
ted and based on a mobile app, the drivers would not be able to provide the service. 
Before the launch of the app, the phenomenon did not exist (or existed in forms eco-
nomically and socially irrelevant) and the defendants set the fares and their variations. 
The provide an “essential and irreplaceable contribution to the development of illegal 
behaviours, which are capable of damaging the claimants”.
Therefore, Uber International B.V. and the other companies of the intricate corpo-
rate world of Uber benefit directly from the drivers’ behaviours and cannot be consi-
dered as mere intermediaries. Consequently, Uberpop – but not Uber itself – falls 
under the antitrust tort provided by art. 2598 no. 3 of the civil code. The driver that 
had been sued, on the other hand, is not found liable, in consideration of the sought 
remedy (the prohibitory interim injunction).
On 25  May 2015, given the unfair competition, the Tribunale issues an interim 
injunction banning the use of the Uberpop service in Italy, as well as of kindred ser-
vices, no matter how they are advertised or called. The Piedmontese court, then, 
sets a penalty for the delay in giving effect to the injunction (€20.000 a day after the 
fifteenth day). Furthermore, the Tribunale orders the publication of the injunction on 
Uber’s website and orders to pay for the trial costs.
The order has been appealed by both the claimants and the defendants. The taxi trade 
unions’ reclamo aimed at include the single Uber driver in the injunction (and will not be 
analysed here), the Uber’s one regards the rest of the ordinanza. The Tribunale rejects 
the latter’s reclamo (thus confirming the above analysed ordinanza) and partly accedes 
to the former’s one by preventing the single driver to provider the Uber pop service.
Uber’s reclamo was based on the following grounds. i. Uberpop is different from the 
taxi service, since it is a technological platform; ii. There is no competition between 
the former and the latter; iii. Uber does not directly benefits in terms of reduction of 
costs; iv. There is no periculum in mora, since it is not proved that the entrance into the 
market of Uber has caused a decrease of the demand for taxies. Let us touch on the 
first claims, which is the most relevant to the issues involved in this article.
According to Uber, Uber pop is merely an app for shared and spontaneous transport, 
entirely different from taxies, and carried out directly from the users, who are part of a 
closed group, that is a community. Uber, allegedly, is a matching marketplace concern-
ing private transport, reserved to a private community and it is not responsible for the 
allocation of the options or for the setting of volumes and prices of the exchanges, “if 
not ex ante through the development of the [surge] algorithm”. Something that is, there-
fore, utterly different form a radio service, since Uber is not, assumedly, using human 
resources in the execution of the transaction, nor is he investing the relevant financial 
means.
UBER LAW AND AWARENESS BY DESIGN
The court confirms the representation proposed by the first judge and clarifies fur-
ther the relevant framework. An app that connects demand and offer in the transport 
service is not to be treated differently from the traditional taxi service where one calls 
the central station that allocates the requests. It is immaterial that Uber, unlike taxies, 
does not make use of human resources: 66 what matters is the final service, regardless 
the use of call centres or algorithms.
The court, then, move on to reiterate the difference between Uber, on the one 
hand, and car sharing, car pooling, and peers- to- peers, on the other hand. With Uber, 
there is no sharing of facilities by a person who would go from A to B to realise their 
own interest and the cost is not agreed between the driver and the rider.
What does not show from the ordinanza of May is the importance of the contracts. 
On the contrary, the court now points out the relevance of the contracts between 
Rasier BV and the drivers, that is exactly the contract that is not publicly available. 
These contracts show that Rasier sets the tariffs unilaterally; driver and rider cannot 
do anything but obey.
The surge pricing system has nothing to do with bartering or other forms of sharing 
economy. Uber pop does not have transparent rules for the fares and their application 
is unforeseeable. This is of sure detriment to the consumers. Moreover, the contracts 
show that the increases of the fares (up to 500%) do not benefit the drivers: they serve 
only Uber’s profit.
Furthermore, even in the unlikely event of some savings for the consumer, the 
balance with security must favour the latter. 67 One might argue that a balance 
should be struck with another public interest, the protection of the environment 
through the reduction of traffic. However, firstly, there is no evidence that Uber’s 
clients are diverted from the taxi drivers. Most importantly, it is sensible to affirm 
that, if Uber did not existed, those clients would make us of public transport vehi-
cles, bicycles, city cars, and kindred forms of transport that, unlike Uber, combat 
pollution.
It is notable that the court takes a technology neutrality approach. Indeed, the 
Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court per Ouseley J had concluded that:
“A taximeter, for the purposes of Section 11 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) 
Act 1998, does not include a device that receives GPS signals in the course of a jour-
ney, and forwards GPS data to a server located outside of the vehicle, which server 
 66 This is one of the defenses of Uber and it does not seem to be contested, but it is contrary to the 
factual truth.
 67 The public regime of taxies, which revolves around the licence, is seen as a means to ensure security. 
It does so through the required guarantees of efficiency of the cars (e.g. tests at a regular interval), 
guarantees of suitability of the drivers (e.g. age limits), and insurance (e.g. adequate ceilings).
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calculates a fare that is partially or wholly determined by reference to distance tra-
velled and time taken, and sends the fare information back to the device”. 68
On the contrary, the Tribunale does not take this rigid approach, it rather prefers 
to look at the actual service, which appears indeed hardly distinguishable from the one 
provided by taxi drivers.
In conclusion, Italy seems to prevent Uber from offering UberPop on the grounds 
of public interest, and in particularly security and environment. These public inter-
ests are at the basis of the public law regime that impose administrative and financial 
burdens on taxi drivers. Similar services, be they called UberPop or not, shall be sub-
ject to the same regime and shall not be provided by companies that hide themselves 
under the appealing, albeit sometimes inappropriate, label of the sharing economy.
The Parliament and the regulators have not intervened yet. However, in November 
2015 an important letter of the President of AGCM has been published. 69 The anti-
trust authority wishes an essential regulation to be adopted in order to strike a balance 
between competition and security. 70 In particular, there would be the need of a third 
category to juxtapose to taxies and private hire vehicles: “online platforms that con-
nect riders and non- professional drivers”.
IV. – Uber legals
To give an account of the complexity of the ecosystem, a look at the legals can be useful. 
Limiting the analysis to the legals applicable to users in the United Kingdom 71 and listed in 
the ad- hoc section of Uber.com, 72 these are:
 68 Transport for London v Uber London Ltd and others, supra, note 49, at 49.
 69 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AS1222 – Legge quadro per il trasporto di persone 
mediante autoservizi pubblici non di linea, 29 September 2015, www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/
allegati- news/AS1222.pdf/download.html.
 70 AGCM believes, together with Uber, that the use of the app can help the environment.
 71 One is targeted only at users in China, that is “Fraudulent activity” (www.uber.com/legal/other/china- 
fraud). One could hardly understand why Uber recalls the importance of the relationship of trust between 
the platform and the users only in a document reserved to the said country (and with no translation from 
Mandarin). It is interesting also that there is “Russia jobs” that states “Due to recent changes in data privacy 
laws in Russia, we are unable to accept online applications from candidates in your country through our 
careers page. However, we would still love for you to apply! Please email russia- recruiting@uber.com” 
(www.uber.com/legal/other/russia- jobs). Some legals are specific to the US, e.g. the Driver Deactiva-
tion Policy (www.uber.com/legal/other/driver- deactivation- us- english/); California TNC (www.uber.
com/legal/other/ca- tnc/) and Chicago TNP (www.uber.com/legal/other/chi- tnp).
 72 The list of legals available if one accesses the service from the app (which is the actual only way to 
book a ride) is by far shorter. Launched the app, one has to spot “About” (in grey and smaller than 
the other functions) and then go to “Legal”, where they will find “Copyright”, “Terms & Conditions”, 
“Privacy policy”, and “Software Licences”.
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a) the Terms and Conditions (T&C) bipartite into Booking Service Terms and Terms 
of Use; 73
b) the User Privacy Statement; 74
c) the Driver Privacy Statement (non- US); 75
d) the Cookie Statement (Global); 76
e) the Uber Copyright Policy; 77
f) the Zero Tolerance Policy; 78
g) the Non- Discrimination Policy; 79
h) the Firearms Prohibition Policy; 80
i) the Guidelines for Law Enforcement Authorities; 81
j) the Guidelines for Third Party Data Request and Service of Legal Documents; 82
k) the Promotion Terms and Conditions; 83
l) the Promotion Agreement Cover Sheet; 84
m) the Accessibility Certification; 85
 73 Last updated on 11 January 2016, the T&C are available at www.uber.com/legal/terms/gb. It is 
noteworthy that the previous version was of 4 December 2015: the good practice of leaving the pre-
vious versions of the legals available would have enabled us to understand the need to change after 
such a short time. The US version has been updated on 2 January 2016, whereas the previous version, 
not available any longer, was of 8 April 2015 (www.uber.com/legal/terms/us).
 74 Last updated on 15 July 2015, see www.uber.com/legal/privacy/users/en. 
 75 Effective as of 15 July 2015, see www.uber.com/legal/privacy/drivers- non- us/en. 
 76 Effective as of 15 July 2015, www.uber.com/legal/privacy/cookies/en.
 77 www.uber.com/legal/copyright/global/. There are three versions: global, US, and Germany.
 78 www.uber.com/legal/other/zero- tolerance- policy. 
 79 www.uber.com/legal/other/non- discrimination- policy. 
 80 www.uber.com/legal/other/firearms- prohibition- policy. 
 81 www.uber.com/legal/other/guidelines- for- law- enforcement. 
 82 www.uber.com/legal/other/service- of- legal- documents. In the version read on 10  December 
2015, there was no reference to the service of legal documents.
 83 Last updated on 14  February 2016, www.uber.com/legal/commercial/promotion- tnc- non- us- 
english/2016-02-04. This document did not exist during the study conducted on 10  December 
2015. Alongside the Promotion Terms and Conditions, the US users should take into account also 
UberEATS General Terms and Conditions, www.uber.com/legal/commercial/uberEATS- tnc- us/
eats- tnc- 2016-02-24. 
 84 The Promotion Terms and Conditions open by saying “These Promotion Terms and Conditions 
(‘Promotion Terms’) are expressly incorporated into and made a part of the Promotion Agreement 
Cover Sheet (‘Cover Sheet’)”. The Cover Sheet, however, is not publicly available.
 85 Last updated on 2 February 2016, www.uber.com/legal/other/accessibility- statement. In the list 
of “other documents” the name is “Accessibility Statement”. This document did not exist during the 
study conducted on 10 December 2015.
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n) the Android App Permissions; 86
o) the iOS App Permissions; 87
p) Bug Bounty Program Terms. 88
Until at least 10 December 2015, there were also the Unsolicited Idea Submission 
Policy 89 and the security policy. Apparently, the latter has been outsourced to a plat-
form created by security leaders from Facebook, Microsoft and Google. 90
It is not clear if the drivers- partners (as Uber calls the users who drive) have their own 
T&C, since the User T&C does not refer expressly to them, but to the “Transportation pro-
viders”. By searching for “Uber drivers terms”, one finds UberMarketplace T&C, 91 which is 
a different service, operated by Uber B.V., the subsidiary of Uber in the Netherlands. It is 
designed to help partner- drivers rent and purchase vehicles, as well as get deals on insurance.
Reading the “legals”, the user- rider does not understand what is its relationship to 
the driver and, most importantly, the one between the latter and the Company. After 
having been substantially misled by the customer support and digging into an unofficial 
forum, 92 I have eventually found the relevant legals. 93
Every city, then, has its own rules for licensing. For instance, in London they vary 
according to the dimension and luxury of the car, and the experience of the driver. 94 
One would expect to find the Developers Terms of Use (ToU) alongside the other 
legals. This is not the case. One has to visit a separate website to find the Developer 
ToU 95 and the Earn with Uber ToU. 96
 86 www.uber.com/legal/other/android- permissions. This document did not exist during the study 
conducted on 10 December 2015. 
 87 www.uber.com/legal/other/ios- permissions. This document did not exist during the study conduc-
ted on 10 December 2015.
 88 Last updated on 8 April 2016, www.uber.com/legal/other/bug- bounty- program- terms. This docu-
ment did not exist during the study conducted on 10 December 2015. 
 89 www.uber.com/legal/unsolicited- idea- submission- policy. The page is no longer available. 
 90 Until 10 December 2015, the Security Policy/Responsible Disclosure Policy was available at www.
uber.com/security. If one visits this URL on 28 April 2016, they get redirected to https://hackerone. 
com/uber, where Uber invites hackers to expose vulnerabilities. It is interesting that only today 
three bug reports have been resolved, which means that cybersecurity is a real issue.
 91 https://drive.uber.com/ukmarketplace/terms- and- conditions.
 92 Uberpeople.net. 
 93 Uber B.V. Services agreement, https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber- regulatory- documents/country/ 
united_kingdom/Uber+BV+Driver+Terms+- +UK+Preview.pdf and Driver Addendum, https://
s3.amazonaws.com/uber- regulatory- documents/country/united_kingdom/Uber+BV+Driver+ 
Addendum+-+UK+Preview.pdf (both of 20 October 2015). 
 94 www.driveuberuki.com/our- cities/london/#1446505645212-909d428a- 7b15. 
 95 Updated on 12 January 2016, https://developer.uber.com/docs/terms- of- use (the version studied 
on 10 December 2015 had been updated on 17 March 2015). 
 96 https://developer.uber.com/docs/affiliate- terms- of- service. These ToU regulate the Affiliate Pro-
gram whose purpose is to allow participants to make referrals from their apps to the Uber platform 
for requesting on- demand transportation and logistics services.
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This above- seen jungle applies to business- to- consumer relations. Business- to- 
business ToS were not publicly available when I started this research. One had to reg-
ister first as a business user to obtain the International (non- U.S.) Terms and Condi-
tions of Service (Business T&C), which inter alia referred to a code of conduct whose 
page could not be found. 97 They are now available, 98 but no reference is made to the 
code, 99 which can be found in the miscellaneous list of “other documents”. 100 How-
ever, the current situation is better than the initial one, when the code of conduct was 
limited only to business clients, whereas there was no link to it in the User T&C. 101
Some services are available to riders, e.g. the fares calculator, but from a website 
which is not operated by Uber and comes with its own privacy policy. 102 To add to the 
complexity, when users download the app, they are bound by the “legals” of the app 
stores; e.g. if they are using Android they are subject to Google’s Play policies. 103 In 
this case, they are also transacting with Google Payments and agreeing to their ToS 104 
and Privacy Notice. 105
The app downloaders must give their permissions. Twenty- five permissions to con-
trol your data and your smartphone (against the average, which is five). 106 Moreo-
ver, the legals of the mobile versions are different from the homologous of the laptop 
version above reported. The mobile legals include only the Copyright Policy, User 
T&C, Privacy Policy, and Software Licences. Surprisingly, the software licences 107 are 
included only in the mobile version and not in the desktop one.
 97 Much peculiarly, the hyperlink did not work, since it sent the user to www.uber.com///www.uber.
com/safety/code- of- conduct. 
 98 International Terms and Conditions of Service, last updated on 11  December 2015, available at 
www.uber.com/legal/business/international/en. 
 99 www.uber.com/legal/other/code- of- conduct.
 100 www.uber.com/legal/other. 
 101 Updated on 8- Apr- 2014, http://2q72xc49mze8bkcog2f01nlh.wpengine.netdna- cdn.com/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/14/2015/05/UberRUSH- Terms- 4-8- 141.pdf. 
 102 http://uberestimate.com/privacy.php. 
 103 https://play.google.com/intl/ALL_uk/about/play- terms.html. 
 104 The Terms of Service – Buyer are effective as of 5 August 2013, https://payments.google.com/
termsOfService?hl=en_GB. 
 105 The Google Payments Privacy Notice, last modified 29- Jun- 2015, is available at https://payments.
google.com/legaldocument?family=0.privacynotice&hl=en_GB. 
 106 K. Olmstead and M. Atkinson, “Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store”, 10 November 2015, 
www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/11/PI_2015-11-10_apps- permissions_FINAL.pdf. 
 107 Software licenses regard Evox Images, Libphonenumber, TITokenField, RRFPSBar, and Google 
Maps SDK for iOS.
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V. – Corporate labyrinth and intricate supply chain
The intricacy of online platforms depends also on the complexity of the corporate 
structure, 108 since Uber Technologies, Inc. 109 has sixty  subsidiaries in the US and 
seventy- five or more around the world. 110
Accepting the User T&C, one is contracting with four companies, Uber London, 111 
Uber Britannia, 112 Uber B.V., 113 and Uber NIR. 114 They are controlled by Uber Tech-
nologies, Inc., which does not appear in the contract. Most of the T&C, however, 
refers to a non- existent 115 company called Uber UK, which “shall mean each of Uber 
London, Uber Britannia, and Uber NIR.” In a lawsuit, who would be the defendant? 116 
Are they genuinely separate companies, since the director is the same? 117 British com-
panies are not the direct subsidiary of the US parent. Users who read the T&C, then, 
may think that Uber B.V plays a role only as the provider of the app. UberMarket 
website, however, specifies that the Dutch subsidiary operates it. 118 The Registrar of 
 108 We are not referring now to the three categories of users, neither to all the actors providing com-
plementary services (cloud storage, redundancy, etc.), nor to all the actors related to the apps that 
interoperate with Uber.
 109 As one can read searching this company in the registry held by the California Secretary of State, the 
company filed the application on 9 August 2010, is not registered under no. C3318029, and falls 
under the Delaware jurisdiction (the search engine is available at http://kepler.sos.ca.gov).
 110 http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/uber- tax- shell. It is impossible to have a precise number of 
subsidiaries, affiliates, etc. For instance, according to other sources the US parent has incorporated 
more than thirty different foreign subsidiaries since 2012 (www.scribd.com/doc/232316744/Uber- 
Ireland- 2- of- 4).
 111 In respect of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998, Uber London is the holder of the relevant 
private hire vehicle (PHV) operator’s licence.
 112 In respect of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, Uber Britannia is the hol-
der of the relevant PHV operator’s licence in each of the district councils (other than the Metropoli-
tan Police District and the City of London) in which it operates. In respect of the Civic Government 
(Scotland) Act 1982, Uber Britannia is the holder of the relevant booking office licences.
 113 Uber B.V. provides the software application and related services.
 114 In respect of the Taxis Act (Northern Ireland) 2008, Uber NIR is the holder of the relevant opera-
tor’s licence.
 115 By using the serach engine of the UK Companies House, one finds Uber UK Limited, which has no 
relation to the company here analysed. More information on the former can be found at www.uber-
 uk.com/aboutus.
 116 It may seem that the main defendant should be Uber Technologies, Inc. (http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2014/10/17/uber- technologies- fights- french- court- ruling).
 117 www.licensedtransportuncovered.com/uber- manchester- and- the- global- paper- trail.
 118 UberMarketplace.co.uk (the “Marketplace”) is operated by Uber B.V. (“Uber”), a company registe-
red in the Netherlands under number 56317441 with a registered address of Vijzelstraat 68, 1017 HL 
Amsterdam. Use of the Marketplace will constitute acceptance of these Terms and Conditions... The 
Marketplace enables Uber partner- drivers, who are independent contractors using the Uber Platform 
in the United Kingdom, as well as new drivers not yet on the Uber platform but that intend to join 
the Uber platform (“Drivers”) to be eligible to receive certain products, services and/or discounts 
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Companies for England and Wales shows that Uber London is owned by a Netherlands 
private partnership called Uber International Holdings B.V. 119 What is this Uber Inter-
national B.V.? It is owned by a type of Dutch partnership known as a Commanditaire 
Vennootschap. Uber International B.V has no establishment in Europe and its headquar-
ters are in Bermuda. 120
It is not entirely clear, finally, whether companies such as Uber Technologies Lim-
ited, 121 Uber Cab Limited, 122 Uber Cars Limited, 123 and Uber Vehicle Rental 124 have 
any relation to the Uber group.
Anyway, one should not believe that the here presented picture is complete. While 
gathering information on the current director of Uber UK and Uber Britannia, I 
have found out that she has been director of another company hitherto unknown, 
Uber Nir Limited, whose field of activity is “to be provided on next annual return”. 
It has one share whose value is one pound; its owner is Uber International Holding 
BV. Uber companies pop up constantly and everywhere; it is impossible to track 
them all.
To add to the complexity, one may consider all the supply chain, that is all the 
third parties Uber negotiate for some of its services. From AudioEye, Inc., a pro-
vider of web accessibility testing and monitoring to HackerOne, for security pur-
poses. Indeed, the Privacy Statement reads that the platform may share the users’ 
information with “Uber subsidiaries and affiliated entities that provide services or 
conduct data Uber”.
Finally, there are subjects who are not stable partners of Uber, but whose software 
or hardware is interoperable with the platform. For instance, the users can choose to 
link, create, or log in to their Uber accounts with a payment provider (e.g., Google 
Wallet) or social media service (e.g., Facebook), or engage with a separate app or 
website that uses Uber’s API or whose API Uber uses. In all these cases, Uber may 
receive information about the users or their connections from that site or app.
provided by third parties when using the Marketplace as set on this Uber Marketplace website, being: 
www.UberMarketplace.co.uk.
 119 www.scribd.com/doc/232316543/Uber- London- Limited- Annual- Return- 2013?in_collec-
tion=4596500.
 120 http://www.licensedtransportuncovered.com/uber- manchester- and- the- global- paper- trail.
 121 Company number 09412838, incorporate on 29 January 2015 (https://beta.companieshouse.gov.
uk/company/09412838). 
 122 Company number 09383213, incorporated on 12 January 2015 (https://beta.companieshouse.gov.
uk/company/09383213/filing- history). 
 123 Company number 09409840, incorporated on 28 January 2015 (https://beta.companieshouse.gov.
uk/company/09409840). 
 124 Company number 09129368, incorporated on 14 July 2014 (https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/
company/09129368). 
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Conclusion: Awareness by design and shared regulation
The fact that the legals of the platforms are not read or understood is “a general phe-
nomenon that relates to the behaviour of human beings when confronted with stand-
ard form agreements”. 125 However, I do not agree with those who “wonder wheter 
the complimentary character of the service would justify a lower protection level 
for these kind of services compared to other contracts where consumers actually pay 
an amount of money”. Differentiate contracts for the “professional”, “for business”, 
“work” version of the services already exist and they offer some room for negotiation 
and customisation. 126 However, on the one hand, business customers are more likely 
to read and understand the legals; on the other hand, what the consumers do not pay 
in a pecuniary way, they do pay in terms of consent to process and resell personal 
data and, more generally, in their capacity as digital labourers. Therefore, it would be 
preposterous according a lower protection to the proletariat 2.0.
One could never expect that downloading an app may have, as an effect, the submer-
sion under the cascade of twenty- seven legals (some unavailable publicly) and twenty- 
five permissions. The system appears opaque and therefore untrustworthy even before 
analysing the content of this contractual quagmire, also due to the very intricate supply 
chain. Uber should simplify and review its legals, for instance taking into account that 
the EU Court of Justice has declared invalid the Safe Harbour decision 127 and that now 
we have the EU- US Privacy Shield. 128
 125 E. Wauters, “Towards a better protection of social media users: a legal perspective on the terms of 
use of social networking sites”, Int J Law Info Tech 2014, 22 (3): 254, 293. The authors underline that 
stickiness and network effects of social network services may reinforce the belief that the legals are 
simply “part of the deal” as a user. Even though these factors do not apply to all the online platforms, 
the oligopolistic structure of the market, the increasing illiteracy of consumers, the timings of online 
transactions, alongside other rational and less rational reasons, explain the application of the problem 
also beyond the realm of social networks.
 126 Cf., e.g., S. Bradshaw, C. Millard, and I. Walden, “Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analy-
sis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services”, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 63/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662374. 
 127 Schrems (Judgment) [2015] EUECJ C- 362/14 (6 October 2015) [2016] 2 CMLR 2. Unlike several 
providers, Uber does not refer expressly to the Safe Harbour. Indeed, the Privacy Statement reads 
that the user’s information may be transferred to “the United States and other countries, some of 
which may have less protective data protection laws than the region in which you reside. Where this 
is the case, we will take appropriate measures to protect your personal information in accordance 
with this Statement”. A clear streamlining to the Privacy Shield would be more appropriate.
 128 On 2 February 2016, the EU and the US have agreed on a new framework for transatlantic data flows: 
the EU- US Privacy Shield. The College of Commissioner has mandated Vice- President Ansip and 
Commissioner Jourová to prepare a draft adequacy decision, which should be adopted by the College 
after obtaining the advice of the Article 29 Working Party and after consulting a committee composed 
of representatives of the Member States. In the meantime, the U.S. side will make the necessary 
preparations to put in place the new framework, monitoring mechanisms and new Ombudsman. The 
draft adequacy decision (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data- protection/files/privacy- shield- adequacy- 
UBER LAW AND AWARENESS BY DESIGN
The findings of this research are confirmed by an empirical study, which concludes 
that “Uber’s digitally and algorithmically mediated system of flexible employment 
builds new forms of surveillance and control into the experience of using the system, 
which result in asymmetries around information and power for workers”. 129
Future research shall focus on the differences of treatment between the three cate-
gories of users (normal riders, businesses, drivers- partners). I will look into the code 
of conduct, the law enforcement policy, 130 and the “non- legal” representations, 131 
since they are fundamental to build transparency and therefore trust.
Inspired by the “data protection by design” 132 approach of the long overdue Euro-
pean general data protection regulation, 133 my main recommendation is to introduce 
tools of ‘awareness by design’ based on an empirical research on the legal and legal 
representations made by online platforms. By “awareness by design”, I mean the use of 
technologies (especially design) to empower the user and make them aware of risks, 
rights, and obligations. One need only think, for instance, how many times one flags 
the “I agree” box of the ToS without even attempting to read the “contractual quag-
mire” 134 at hand. There are technical means to assess if the consumer is flagging with-
out reading, for instance assessing how long does it take them to scroll the ToS page. 
Prohibiting to flag under these circumstances might be seen as paternalistic, since it is 
part of the right to self- determination to agree without reading a contract. Therefore, 
decision_en.pdf) and the text of the Privacy Shield (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data- protection/
files/privacy- shield- adequacy- decision- annex- 2_en.pdf) have been presented on 29 February 2016.
 129 A. Rosenblat and L. Stark, “Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic 
Work” (October 15, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686227.
 130 It is commendable that Uber has published a Transparency Report providing an overview of infor-
mation that was provided to U.S. state and local regulators and law enforcement agencies between 
July and December 2015. Uber has received 613 requests for law enforcement purposes (more than 
3 requests a day), in 84.8% of the requests some data were produced. It is interesting that whereas 
in the event of requests for other purposes (e.g. from regulatory authorities), the tables show that 
in some cases Uber has resisted and negotiated, when it comes to law enforcement the only cases 
when Uber does not hand over the users’ data is when the LEA withdraw the requests or if no data 
are found (which happens only in 15.4% of the requests.) See more at https://transparencyreport.
uber.com/ (last updated on 15 April 2016). 
 131 There is not always consistency between the obligations emerging by the “legals” and how the plat-
forms actually behave, as emerges, for instance, from blogs and forums. 
 132 Privacy and data protection by design are increasingly subject to deep and original research. For a 
recent example see L. Urquhart, Privacy by Design and the Internet of Things: From Rhetoric to Prac-
tice using Information Privacy Cards, Paper accepted at the Bileta Annual Conference 2016, Hatfield, 
11-12 April 2016.
 133 See the European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regu-
lation) (COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)).
 134 G.  Noto La Diega and I.  Walden, “Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into the 
Nest”, op. cit.
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one might prefer a “nudge” approach and, say, set as a default option a ‘I have not 
read’ box. Thus, consumers who flags automatically the said box without reading will 
receive an error message who draws their attention to this fact.
Practically, I suggest to develop a mobile app comparing standard terms and alert-
ing a user to any peculiar terms in the contract. The consumers themselves will be 
engaged and will rate the legal quality and transparency of the legals; an algorithm will 
produce the final rating combining the output of the said empirical research and the 
opinions of the consumers. The impact will be measured via the reviews to the app. A 
second step may be to invite the consumers to join a private group on an existing social 
platform, 135 where they could interact, create critical mass, share information on their 
rights and on their experience as consumers, network, etc. In other words, consumers 
would be protagonist of a collective awareness movement. 136 That collective aware-
ness is the way forward is shown, among other things, by a recent turn of the Uber 
movement. Apparently, in February 2016, the company had decided to impose Uber-
Black drivers (luxury cars) to accept riders on UberX (the low- cost option). When the 
policy was scheduled to become effective, the drivers caravaned to Uber’s office in 
Dallas; after a three- days standoff, Uber allowed them to opt out of the policy. 137 One 
must point out that the fact that the app does not allow communication between users 
(both drivers and riders) is not helping awareness, trust, and accountability.
Future developments of the “awareness by design” app may make full use of big data, 
predictive analytics and machine learning, in order to be able to become a decision- 
making tool. I imagine that when the consumer is about to buy a product, they launch 
the app that analyse and compare the quality of the legals and tells the consumer not 
only which product comes with the best legals, but also which legals are the best for 
the consumer. Prosumers, for instance, have different needs, if compared with tradi-
tional consumers.
It might be said that consumers are not actually concerned about their rights and 
obligations. For instance, in 2014 it has been forecast that “European users or consum-
ers will not be inclined to bring large, powerful (social network service) providers to 
court, in order to establish clarity as to the validity and enforceability of the existing 
provisions”. 138 It could be observed that the action brought by Maximilian Schrems 
 135 I would disregard the option to create an ad- hoc platform, since consumers would hardly participate, 
given the oligopolistic structure of the market and the relevant network effect. 
 136 See the EU Commission Research Program on H2020 on Collective Awareness Platforms. Cf. 
S. McLean and M. Samavi, “EC’s consultation on online platforms proves controversial”, op. cit.
 137 N.  Scheiber, “Uber Drivers and Others in the Gig Economy Take a Stand”, New York Times 
2  February 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/uber- drivers- and- others- in- the- gig- 
economy- take- a- stand.html. 
 138 E. Wauters, “Towards a better protection of social media users: a legal perspective on the terms of 
use of social networking sites”, op. cit., 254.
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against Facebook 139 has proved the assertion wrong. Most importantly, the “awareness 
by design” app may be a tool to verify if the fact that consumers do not read the ToS 
depends on the fact that they cumbersome and opaque or on an actual carelessness. 
Beware, however. The consumers might not care because they think that they have no 
bargaining power, but another result of the proposed system is to create critical mass 
through collective awareness, whose ultimate result should be a change of approach on 
the side of businesses. Indeed, the authors of the wrong prediction pointed out two 
solutions to the said problems: to develop efforts to incentivise service providers to 
adopt consumer- friendly ToS and to raise the awareness of users with regard to the 
content of ToS. This work presumes to have given a contribution in both the direc-
tions.
One ought not to think, however, that one can rely exclusively on technology. The 
legal systems have to evolve accordingly. Just to make a suggestion, the consumers 
should have appropriate means not to be bound by the strict alternative between either 
agreeing or not using the service, 140 thus rehumanising a dehumanised contract. 141
Legislators cannot ignore that there is a need for some sort of regulation. The fact 
that it is impossible to keep up with all the lawsuits involving Uber is the best evidence 
of this. 142 Nor legal uncertainty and opaqueness are helping the consumers, nor the 
relevant market can grow under these conditions. In Italy and elsewhere, 143 legislators 
and regulators are making proposals to take a stand. 144 Further empirical evidence is 
 139 Schrems (Judgment) [2015] EUECJ C- 362/14 (6 October 2015) [2016] 2 CMLR 2.
 140 www.snapchat.com/terms; www.whatsapp.com/legal/; www.spotify.com/us/legal/end- user- 
agreement/plain/; www.apple.com/legal/internet- services/itunes/. 
 141 According to N. Irti, “Scambi senza accordo”, Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 1994, II, 
347, the decline of the agreement, stemming from the crisis of the word and of dialogue, dilutes the 
contract and transforms it into the mere combination of two unilateral acts. However, cf. G. Oppo, 
“Disumanizzazione del contratto”, Rivista di diritto civile 1998, I, 525.
 142 While I am finalising this article, I am reading that, on 26 April 2016, in Powers et al v Richard et 
al, the 24th  Judicial District Court has dismissed a lawsuit from Jefferson Parish taxi drivers who 
claimed that Uber drivers had carried out unfair trade practices. W.P. Nobles, “In Uber challenge, 
taxi drivers lose Jefferson Parish lawsuit”, The Times- Picayune 26 April 2016, www.nola.com/crime/
index.ssf/2016/04/uber_jefferson_parish_drivers.html, informs as well that there is a similar suit 
in New Orleans between cab drivers and UberX drivers, and a pending Jefferson Parish government 
suit against the company for allegedly violating parish ordinances.
 143 D. Cadbury et al., “A disruptive influence” Competition Law Insight, 2015, 14(12), 13-15, examine 
how the United Kingdom, the European Union, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy are attempting 
to regulate Uber.
 144 Alongside the analysed legislative proposal on online platforms and the letter of the AGCM, further 
research is needed on the activity of regulators. For instance, see Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti 
(Transport Authority), Atto di segnalazione al Governo e al Parlamento sull’autotrasporto di persone non di 
linea: taxi, noleggio con conducente e servizi tecnologici per la mobilità, 21 May 2015, (http://www.autorita- 
trasporti.it/wp- content/uploads/2015/06/Atto- di- segnalazione_signed.pdf). On car pooling, see, 
e.g. decreto ministeriale 1 February 2013 (Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti) on “Diffusione dei 
sistemi di trasporto intelligenti (ITS) in Italia”, which implements directive 2010/40/EU on the framework 
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needed to choose between hard law, soft law, co- regulation, self regulation,  etc. I 
am convinced that it is necessary to strike a balance between two needs: avoiding a 
one- size- fits- all approach and shying away from sector- specific “laws of the horse” or 
even “Uber laws” (let us imagine what would happen in terms of overlaps if someone 
had three laws for online platforms, sharing economy, and liability of intermediar-
ies). Therefore, I have the impression that a co- regulatory approach might help in this 
respect. “A shared regulation for the shared economy”, one may be tempted to say. In 
addition, co- regulation should be coupled with a strengthened coordination between 
the regulators, since the market of platforms is heterogeneous and liable to be regu-
lated by different authorities.
Nonetheless, given that the law is a hysteretic system, 145 I hope that, in the meantime, 
the development of “awareness by design” tools brings companies to modify their busi-
ness models and their attitude towards consumers, once they will understand that legal 
clarity, trust, and accountability are competitive advantages.
for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with 
other modes of transport. The decreto invites local communities to favour car pooling in a context of 
smart mobility.
 145 See, more broadly, G. Noto La Diega, “In light of the ends. Copyright hysteresis and private copy 
exception after the British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) and others 
v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills case”, Quaderni di Diritto Mercato Tecnologia, 
2015, II.
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